The Disarmament and International Security (DISEC) Committee is a General Assembly committee within the United Nations. DISEC aims to deal with threats to international peace and security, security issues on the international scale, and disarmament. Maintaining global security is DISEC’s primary goal, and as such, the promotion of nuclear, biological, and chemical disarmament, the limitation and regulation of conventional weapons, and the elimination of illicit arms trades are pillars of DISEC’s approach to global security. As DISEC is a General Assembly Committee, its resolutions are not legally binding, though the committee may make recommendations to member states or call upon the UN Security Council to take further action where appropriate.

A relatively modern problem, the concept of weaponizing space has only recently made its way from science fiction to a reality that modern nations have to contend and prepare for. Even then, with only a few countries possessing the requisite technological knowledge, this new domain of warfare is ripe for cooperation – or competition between the great powers.

Most “weapons” currently in space consist of a vast number of satellites. While most of these satellites have legitimate civilian uses, a number are also reserved for militaries around the world to collect information, maintain communications, and for other logistical purposes. With the evolving problem of space debris as well as rising tensions around the world between rival great powers, the potential for more significant and destructive weapons in space remain a possibility, particularly if nation states feel their adversary is going to strike first. Currently, several countries have tested anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities that often include launching kinetic or non-kinetic weapons at satellites to cause their destruction, though this has created significant space debris as a result. This space debris has the potential to risk harm to civilian space craft from all nations, especially if the resulting collision would fall on citizens.

While space has been weaponized with satellites that have military functions, an arms race in this domain has the potential to create additional instability, fuel tensions, and have potentially destructive consequences for all of humanity. A number of existing legal treaties deal with space-related activities, such as the weaponizing of space, but are often seen as inadequate in dealing with today’s growing technological capabilities. In a world where tensions have seemingly rising since the end of the Cold War, cooperation in space will ensure that battlegrounds remain on Earth and minimize risk to other countries.

What are the primary stakeholders?

How do we (DISEC) de-incentivize any individual country from weaponizing space?

What are the “pros” for individual countries in developing space weaponry?

What are some of the technological barriers that prevent countries from developing space weapons?

Prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)

Defining and Regulating the Weaponization of Space

Space Weaponization and the United Nations Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist

With the prevalence of social media, governments around the world have both the unique opportunity and challenges concerning what private citizens do on their phones. Both autocratic and democratic governments have a vested interest in monitoring, or at least, being aware of rival nations using technology to influence other citizens.

While examples of state-to-state cyber warfare exist, such as Stuxnet, targeted misinformation/disinformation efforts have been most successfully seen in Russian efforts to influence the Brexit vote in 2015 and the 2016 American election. This effort has only intensified after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. While an educated population is the strongest counter to the threats of these efforts, it is evident that these misinformation campaigns are working. Governments, both democratic and autocratic, have taken to censorship to try and fight against this threat with a notable example being the many countries have implemented either partial or total bans on Tiktok. Particularly in democracies with free elections, there are notable concerns in how to best counter dis and misinformation campaigns from hostile interests.

Since 2011, a number of countries have passed legislation aiming to counter misinformation on social media. Unfortunately, the prevalence of misinformation, ill-intentioned or otherwise, as well as the repercussions on free speech, essential to any democracy, have made many of these laws and practices not particularly effective in accomplishing their goal. In this era of great state competition, the use of cyberwarfare in this manner can be used by governments to accomplish many of their tasks without risking major military and economic casualties. If countries want to effectively counter cyberwarfare, then explicit definitions and systems must be created to counter these threats. Could this Committee help formulate a more effective response to this growing problem with the approval of all major powers?

 Which form of cyberwarfare is this Committee primarily concerned about and be prepared to deal with?

To what extent is this Committee prepared to make concessions to autocratic or democratic governments to further a proposal limiting nation states from utilizing cyber technology in this manner?

Other than banning specific applications, what other policy options can governments implement to defend themselves against dis and mis-information campaigns?

What repercussions, if any, should nation-states face if they are currently engaging in, or choose to engage in cyberwarfare mechanisms?

 In this era of hybrid warfare, what constitutes cyberwarfare?

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